Indian Federalism — Constitutional to Cooperative

What kind of federation is India?

The Indian Constitution begins, in Article 1, with the words: "India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States." The framers deliberately avoided the word "federation." Dr. B.R. Ambedkar explained the choice in the Constituent Assembly: "The Union is indissoluble; the States have no right of secession." Unlike the United States — where states retained sovereignty and "ratified" the federal compact — Indian states never possessed sovereignty separately. They were created by the Constitution itself.

Constitutional scholars have classified India's polity variously:

• K.C. Wheare (1953) — "quasi-federal" — because the Centre has overwhelming dominance.
• Granville Austin (1966) — "cooperative federalism" — emphasising the spirit of working together.
• S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — the Supreme Court held federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be destroyed by amendment.
• Justice K.K. Mathew — "centralised federation."
• Louise Tillin (2019) — "asymmetric federation" — different states have different relationships with the Centre (Article 370, Sixth Schedule, Article 371).

The pragmatic answer: India is federal where the Constitution divides powers and provides institutional balance, but unitary where the Centre is supreme — particularly in emergency, foreign affairs, and defence. The balance shifts over time depending on political circumstances.

Federal and unitary features — side by side

The unitary features are not accidents. The Constituent Assembly's choice was shaped by recent Partition violence, the integration of 565 princely states, the linguistic diversity, and the need to industrialise an underdeveloped economy — all of which seemed to require a strong central authority.

Division of legislative powers — Schedule VII

The 42nd Amendment (1976) moved five subjects from State List to Concurrent List: Education, Forests, Weights & Measures, Protection of Wild Animals and Birds, Administration of Justice. This shifted significant power to the Centre — particularly Education, where the centralisation has driven contemporary disputes (NEET, NEP 2020, CUET).

Residuary powers (subjects not in any list) lie with the Centre under Article 248. This was a deliberate departure from the US model (where residuary powers lie with states) — chosen to allow Parliament to legislate on emerging subjects (cyberspace, biotechnology, etc.).

When Parliament and a State legislate on the same Concurrent List subject, Article 254 resolves conflict:

• Central law prevails over earlier state law on the same subject;
• State law can prevail if it received Presidential assent under Article 254(2);
• Parliament can still later override the state law by enacting a new central law.

Key commissions on Centre-State relations

Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) — 1966-70

India's first major review of administrative governance, chaired by Morarji Desai (later K. Hanumanthaiah). Made limited recommendations on Centre-State relations — primarily on All-India Services and administrative coordination.

Rajamannar Committee — 1969 (Tamil Nadu)

Set up by the DMK government in Tamil Nadu to study Centre-State relations. Recommended major decentralisation: abolition of All-India Services, transfer of subjects to State List, dilution of Article 356. Politically influential but not binding on the Centre.

Sarkaria Commission — 1983-88

The most consequential federal review. Set up by the Indira Gandhi government, chaired by retired SC Judge Justice R.S. Sarkaria. Submitted 247 recommendations:

• Article 356 to be used "sparingly, in extreme cases as a measure of last resort";
• Governor should consult Chief Minister before exercising discretion;
• Inter-State Council should be set up under Article 263 (done in 1990);
• All-India Services should be retained for administrative cohesion;
• Concurrent List should not be expanded without state consultation;
• Residuary powers should remain with Centre;
• Permanent Inter-State Trade Commission needed.

Punchhi Commission — 2007-10

The Commission on Centre-State Relations, chaired by retired Chief Justice M.M. Punchhi. Built on Sarkaria but addressed contemporary issues:

• Recommended a "communal violence" treatment that doesn't justify Article 356 by default;
• Said Governor's appointment should follow a fixed procedure with consultation;
• Governor's tenure should not be terminable by Centre at pleasure;
• Inter-State Council should meet more regularly;
• Recommended a Concurrent List + sub-categorisation system for better division.

Institutions of cooperative federalism

The Governor question — perennial flashpoint

The Governor sits at the structural fault-line of Indian federalism. Article 153 requires every state to have a Governor; Article 155 says the Governor is appointed by the President (effectively, the Centre); Article 156 says the Governor holds office "during the pleasure of the President."

This creates an immediate tension. The Governor is constitutionally the head of the state government, supposed to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. But the Governor is also appointed by, and removable by, the Centre — creating a potential agency problem when opposition parties rule the state.

Three recent disputes have crystallised this tension:

1. Karnataka 2018-19, Maharashtra 2019, Goa 2017 — Governors invited specific parties to form government in disputed situations. The Supreme Court intervened in each, often ordering immediate floor tests.
2. Bills assent delays — Governors of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, Telangana (between 2021-24) sat indefinitely on Bills passed by state Assemblies. Some Bills were pending for over 3 years.
3. Tamil Nadu v. State of Tamil Nadu (April 2024) — Justice J.B. Pardiwala-led bench held that the Governor cannot indefinitely delay assent. A 3-month outer limit was prescribed, after which the Governor is deemed to have given assent or the Bill is treated as having been forwarded to the President. The most significant federalism verdict in a decade.

"The constitutional scheme does not contemplate the Governor as an island, immune to the will of the elected state legislature." — Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Tamil Nadu Governor verdict, April 2024.

Asymmetric federalism — special provisions

India's federalism is asymmetric — different states have different constitutional relationships with the Centre.

• Article 371 series (A through J) — special provisions for various states: Nagaland (371A), Assam (371B), Manipur (371C), Andhra Pradesh/Telangana (371D), Sikkim (371F), Mizoram (371G), Arunachal Pradesh (371H), Goa (371I), Karnataka (371J), Maharashtra/Gujarat (371).
• Sixth Schedule — autonomous tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram with their own Autonomous District Councils.
• Fifth Schedule — Scheduled Areas and Tribes in nine states with Tribes Advisory Councils.
• Special category status (now phased out under 14th FC) — historically gave higher central transfers to 11 states (NE + Himalayan).
• UT with legislature — Delhi, J&K, Puducherry have a hybrid governance model.

Article 370 used to be the most prominent asymmetric provision — abrogated in August 2019. Read the full Article 370 explainer for that story.

Landmark cases on federalism

Contemporary federal disputes (2020-26)

• Three Agricultural Laws (2020) — Centre legislated on agriculture (state subject) using its Concurrent List powers in adjacent areas. Repealed after farmer protests (December 2021).
• IAS deputation rules amendment (2022) — Centre proposed unilateral deputation of IAS officers; rejected by several states.
• NEP 2020 + NEET + CUET — Tamil Nadu, Kerala consistently challenge centralisation of education policy.
• Delhi Services Act 2023 — Parliament overrode SC verdict on services control.
• GST compensation cess extension — recurring tensions over cess sunset date.
• One Nation One Election proposal — High-level committee under Ramnath Kovind submitted report March 2024 recommending simultaneous Lok Sabha + state elections. Federal implications still being debated.
• Population-based delimitation (2026) — the census-based redistribution of Lok Sabha seats will shift parliamentary weight toward northern states with higher population growth, creating tensions with southern states that have controlled their population growth more effectively. Constitution's freeze (42nd Amendment) ends with the next delimitation.

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